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Abstract (128 words) 
In this study, we make a first attempt to investigate the mechanisms of conditional 
cooperation in giving outside experiments, using retrospective survey data on charitable 
giving (the Giving the Netherlands Panel Study 2005, N=1,474). Our results show that in the 
case of door-to-door donations, social information affects perceived social norms for giving 
and, through this perception, influences the level of actual donations. The effect of social 
information on actual door-to-door donations is fully mediated by perceived social norms for 
giving. Furthermore, we found empirical support for the giving standard hypothesis. People in 
different income categories donate roughly the same amounts in separate instances (they use 
the same social information), and as a result people in lower income households donate a 
higher percentage of their income to charitable organizations. 
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The Giving Standard: Conditional Cooperation in the Case of Charitable Giving 
 
Introduction 
In a relative sense, the poor are known to be more generous charitable donors than those who 
are financially better off. People with a lower income often donate a higher percentage of 
their income to charitable organizations than people with an average income (Hoge and Yang, 
1994; Independent Sector, 2002; James III and Sharpe, 2007; Jencks, 1987; McClelland and 
Brooks, 2004; Schervish and Havens, 1995). But why is that the case? Literature suggest 
several explanations (e.g., Jencks, 1987; Schervish and Havens, 1995), but one shortfall in 
many studies on charitable giving that examine the relationship between income and giving is 
the lack of (empirically-tested) explanations for the proportional higher donations of the poor. 
However, there are some ad hoc explanations. Jencks (1987) and Schervish & Havens (1995) 
for example suggest that theoretically, the high proportional donations of those with a lower 
income can be explained by the religious poor, who donate disproportional amounts to their 
church. This is labeled the ‘sect’ effect. Iannaconne (1988) does show that in the U.S. lower 
income households belong disproportional to sect and sect-like religious denominations, and 
members of these sects donate the highest proportion of income to religious organizations. In 
a direct test of the ‘sect’ effect of giving in the Netherlands, Wiepking (2007; 2008) finds a 
stronger negative effect of income on proportion of income donated to religious organizations 
compared to all organizations. However, this stronger negative effect cannot be explained 
with higher religious participation of lower income groups.    
Another explanation for the higher proportional donations of lower income households is 
given by James & Sharpe (2007). They argue that a ‘low income, high asset’ effect can 
account for the higher proportional donations of lower income households. James and Sharpe 
find that, in the United States, high committed donors (households that donate over 10% of 
their after-tax income) with a lower income actually have higher levels of wealth than non-
committed lower income households. These higher levels of wealth could explain the higher 
proportional donations of lower income households. Wiepking (2007) showed that the ‘low 
income, high asset’ explanation could not explain the higher proportional donations of lower 
income households in the Netherlands. 
Finally, Wiepking (2007) suggests that the higher proportional donations of the poor can be 
explained by the giving standard hypothesis. This giving standard refers to norms concerning 
the level of donations in specific situations that people in different income groups share. 
Many people donate the same amounts when -for example- making donations in a door-to-
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door collection or in response to a direct mail letter. This implies that many people in middle 
and higher income groups donate only slightly higher absolute amounts than people in lower 
income groups, when considering separate incidences of giving. Consequently, the total 
donations of people with a lower income consist of a larger proportion of their income than 
the total donations of people with a higher income. Again, this explanation was not 
empirically tested.  
Experiments conducted by social psychological and economists show that many people are 
‘conditionally cooperative’ when it comes to making public good contributions (Fischbacher, 
Gachter, and Fehr, 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Keser and Winden, 2000). People who are 
conditional cooperators are willing to contribute more to a public good the more others 
contribute. Could conditional cooperation lead to a giving standard and explain the negative 
relation between income and proportional donations? In this study, we will use the Giving in 
the Netherlands Panel Study 2005 (GINPS05; N=1,474) in order to answer this question.  
 
Conditional cooperation in the case of charitable giving 
Experimental results show that the charitable behavior of others does indeed influence ones 
own giving behavior, as expected from conditional cooperation. In a natural field experiment, 
Heldt (2005) studies conditional cooperation in the case of donations for the preparation of ski 
tracks in Sweden among cross country skiers. He finds evidence in support of the conditional 
cooperation hypothesis, as the probability that Swedish cross country skiers donate is higher 
when their belief of others’ contribution is increasing.  
Not only does conditional cooperation increase the contribution rate, it also affects the level of 
donations. People donate more money when they have information that other people also 
donate more. In a public goods experiment conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) 50% of the 
respondents show conditional behavior that affected their level of contributions. When these 
conditional cooperators received information about an increase in the average contribution of 
other participants, they increased their own contribution with nearly the same amount. In a 
natural field experiment, Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman (2007) provided visitors to 
a National park in Costa Rica with reference information on the donations of others. They 
found that providing a smaller reference amount decreases the size of the contribution, just as 
providing a larger reference amount increases it. In another field experiment, Shang (2008) 
used a fundraising campaign by a public radio station to show how social information can 
influence individual donations. Listeners who called the radio station to make a pledge were 
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informed about a (fictional) donation, made by a previous caller. Providing manipulated 
information about relatively high donations of others significantly increased the contributions.  
In addition Shang finds that the information about other people’s donations affects the donor's 
belief of what others are contributing, thus directly influencing the donor's perceived norms 
on charitable giving: those who believe others give more contribute more themselves. Using 
an experimental study Shang demonstrates that these perceived norms actually fully mediate 
the effect of information about other donations on the giving levels of individuals. In other 
words, the given social information affects the perceived social norms and, through this 
perception, influences the level of donations. 
 
<<Insert figure 1 about here>> 
 
Figure 1 displays the conceptual model of conditional cooperation in the case of charitable 
giving as suggested by Shang (2008). Social information on giving by other donors 
determines peoples’ perceived social norms for giving, which in turn determine people’s 
actual donating behavior.  
In experiments, participants are provided with social information by experiment leaders. 
However, in real life, when deciding on the level of charitable giving, it is less clear how 
people find and evaluate social information. Cialdini & Goldstein (2004) argue that norms 
about appropriate contributions are often deduced from the behavior of others. We assume 
that people evaluate the charitable behavior of others in their social network, and use this as 
social information on giving. We thus argue that when people display conditional cooperative 
behavior in the case of charitable donations, they will use social information based on giving 
behavior present in their social networks to formulate perceived social norms for giving, 
which in turn affects their level of giving. 
In this study, we will make a first attempt to investigate the mechanisms of conditional 
cooperation in giving outside experiments, using retrospective survey data on charitable 
giving. We will start by investigating how social information on giving relates to people’s 
perceived social norms for giving. Secondly, we will show whether the relationship between 
social information and giving is mediated by the relationship between social norms and 
giving. We will conclude with showing the consequences of conditional cooperation in giving 
behavior for the giving standard hypothesis.  
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Data and measurements 
In this study, we make a first attempt to investigate the mechanisms of conditional 
cooperation in giving outside experiments, using retrospective survey data on charitable 
giving. We use the third wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2005 (GINPS05, 
2005). The GINPS is a bi-annual longitudinal survey study on charitable giving and 
volunteering in the Netherlands, which started in 2001. In May 2006, 1,868 persons were 
questioned about their donating behavior in 2005. In total, 1,474 respondents (79%) 
completed the questionnaire, using Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview 
procedures (CASI). After using a weight factor based on age, sex and urbanization, the data 
are representative of the Dutch population. GINPS05 includes behavioral information on 
amounts donated in specific incidences of giving, demographic characteristics, as well as 
attitudinal information on amounts that are considered appropriate to give in specific 
instances of giving both for others (social information) and for oneself (perceived social 
norms). 
We measured social information on giving by asking respondents what amount they believe 
that others give each time they donate with one of three different methods: in response to a 
door-to-door collection, in response to a direct mail letter, and by means of regularly 
scheduled payments (the latter not specifically following a request). These three methods of 
giving are omnipresent in the Netherlands, as well as in other Western countries (ACOSS, 
2005; CAF, 2006; Imagine Canada, 2006; Jackson and Latané, 1981; Sargeant and Hudson, 
2008; Weyant, 1996). In 2005, 91% of the Dutch households donated by means of a door-to-
door collection, 30% donated by means of a direct mail letter, and 49% donated by means of a 
(regularly) scheduled payment. By selecting these three methods of giving, we hope to 
capture the effects of social information about different types of donations.  
The question on social information was phrased in a way that respondents would name the 
actual amount they believed others would donate with the three methods of giving. It 
specifically did not mention the option of an expected donation of zero euro. However, some 
respondents expected others to not donate at all and answered that they believed others would 
give zero euro.  
We measured perceived norms on giving by asking respondents what amount they find 
appropriate to give when they donate money themselves in response to a door-to-door 
collection, in response to a direct mail letter, and by means of a regularly scheduled payment.  
Finally, we measured actual giving behaviour by selecting people who had been solicited to 
make a donation in a door-to-door collection and had received a direct mail letter in the two 
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weeks prior to the survey, and ask them whether and how much they had given in response to 
these requests. Note that social information on giving and perceived norms on giving were 
subsequent questions, asked in the beginning of the questionnaire. The question on actual 
amount donated in a response to a door-to-door and direct mail solicitation was asked 
separately halfway through the questionnaire. Actual amount donated was part of a larger 
item that asks people whether or not they were asked to donate to charitable organizations in 
the two weeks prior to the questionnaire, for a number of methods. People who indicated 
having received a request to make a donation in a door-to-door (42%) or direct mail 
solicitation (16%) over the past two weeks were asked how much they donated in these 
instances. When people donated nothing in response to these requests, they were given value 
0. 
Annual after-tax household income was measured by asking respondents about their own and 
(if applicable) their partner’s monthly after-tax income from eight different sources (paid 
work, welfare payments, social security benefits-unemployment, disability, and ‘other’-, 
pension, student benefits, and alimony). Respondents choosing not to state their exact income 
were offered indicative categories, which were recoded to the mean value, resulting in no 
missing values on the income variables. Total monthly after-tax income was calculated by 
adding all sources of income, multiplying by twelve to create an annual estimate and 
combining respondent and partner income (where applicable) to create a total for each 
household. Median annual after-tax household income is €24,000, highest income is 
€370,000. Comparison with annual after-tax household income of the Dutch population 
indicates that the respondents in GINPS05 are representative for lower to middle-high income 
households (Statistics Netherlands, 2008). We use both income in ten categories and the 
natural log of annual after-tax household income in the analyses. Table 1 gives an overview of 
the variables used in the analyses. 
 
<<Insert table 1 about here>> 
 
Results 
From experiments on the role of social information in giving, Shang (2008) derived the 
conclusion that social information on giving by other donors determines peoples’ perceived 
social norms for giving, which in turn determine people’s actual donating behavior. How does 
the social information on giving for respondents in the GINPS05 survey relate to their 
perceived social norms for giving? 
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<<Insert figure 2 about here>> 
 
Figure 2 shows the mean amount of donations respondents believe others to give (social 
information on giving) and the mean amount of donations they themselves find appropriate to 
give (perceived social norms for giving). For all types of giving the social information is on 
average slightly higher than the perceived social norms. It is interesting that people believe 
others should give more than they should give themselves. Paired samples tests show that the 
social information and perceived social norms for direct mail giving (t-value=-2.28; p≤.05) 
and regularly scheduled payments (t-value=-2.32; p≤.05) do differentiate significantly. There 
is no significant difference between social information and perceived social norms for door-
to-door donations. 
 
Social information, perceived norms and giving 
In figure 1 we showed the conceptual model for mediation of the relationship between social 
information and actual giving by perceived social norms, based on the experimental results 
from Shang (2008). We now investigate whether the relationship between social information 
and actual giving is mediated by perceived social norms in the case of reported door-to-door 
and direct mail donations. Figure 3a shows the standardized coefficients for relationships 
between social information, perceived norms, and actual giving in door-to-door giving. 
 
<<Insert figure 3a about here>> 
 
The results of a Sobel’s test for mediation show that the effect of social information on actual 
amount donated in door-to-door giving is fully mediated by perceived social norms (Sobel z-
value=6.38, p≤.001).  
Figure 3b shows the beta coefficients for relationships between social information, perceived 
norms, and actual giving for direct mail donations. The results of a Sobel’s test for mediation 
show that the effect of social information on actual amount donated in direct mail giving is 
not mediated by perceived social norms (Sobel z-value=n.s.).  
 
<<Insert figure 3b about here>> 
 
Further analyses show that when we exclude the nondonors (respondents that were asked to 
make a donation with a direct mail letter two weeks prior to responding to the questionnaire, 
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but did not comply; N=161, 11% of respondents requested) from the analyses, we find 
complete mediation of the social information effect on direct mail donations by perceived 
social norms.
1
  
 
Results of conditional cooperation for the giving standard 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between different income categories and both perceived social 
norms and actual donation in door-to-door and direct mail giving. Figure 4 shows that there is 
no clear relationship between income categories and both perceived social norms and actual 
donation in the case of door-to-door giving. This is confirmed by both insignificant results in 
an ANOVA test of differences between income categories for perceived social norms and 
actual donation, and by the insignificant correlation between the natural log of income and 
both perceived norms and actual donation in door-to-door giving.  
 
<<Insert figure 4 about here>> 
 
The relationship depicted in figure 4 between perceived social norms and actual donation in 
the case of direct mail giving is less clear. There is a slight resemblance to a U-shaped relation 
between mean perceived social norm and income categories. The results of an ANOVA test 
show that there are no significant differences between the income groups in perceived social 
norms for direct mail giving. There is also an insignificant (negative) relationship between 
income and perceived social norms for direct mail giving (Peason’s r=-.042; n.s.). We thus 
find no significant differences between the actual donation in direct mail giving and both 
income in categories and the natural log of income.  
We can conclude that people in different income categories share approximately the same 
perceived norms for giving, affecting the level of their actual donation in the case of door-to-
door donations and direct mail donations. This is empirical support for the giving standard, as 
suggested by Wiepking (2007). Many people in middle and higher income groups donate 
approximately the same absolute amounts than people in lower income groups, when 
considering separate incidences of giving. Consequently, the total donations of people with a 
lower income consist of a larger proportion of their income than the total donations of people 
with a higher income. We find that the perceived social norms as discussed in the theory of 
                                      
1
 Results available from the author. In the case of door-to-door donations, the effect of social information on 
donations is fully mediated by perceived social norms, both when the nondonors are included and when they are 
excluded from the analyses.  
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conditional cooperation are approximately similar for different income groups, indicating an 
absolute giving standard, which can explain the negative relationship between income and 
proportional donations. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
In this study, we investigated the mechanism of conditional cooperation in charitable giving, 
using retrospective survey data. Our results show support for the theory of conditional 
cooperation in the case of door-to-door donations (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr, 2001; Frey 
and Meier, 2004; Shang, 2008). Social information on giving affects perceived social norms 
on giving and, through this perception, influences the level of donations. The effect of social 
information on actual door-to-door donations is fully mediated by perceived social norms for 
giving. 
In the case of direct mail donations, we find that the effect of social information on giving is 
fully mediated by perceived social norms for giving when only donors are considered, but not 
when both donors and nondonors are considered. One post hoc explanation for this result is 
that there is a selection effect: Only people willing to make donations in direct mail 
campaigns in the first place are susceptible to social information on donations. The fact that 
we do not find the same selection effect in the case of door-to-door donations could be 
because of the differences in percentage of people making donations with these methods over 
the course of a year: 91% makes a donation in a door-to-door campaign and 30% in a direct 
mail campaign. With 91% of the people making donations in a door-to-door campaign, there 
can hardly be a selection effect.  
Another explanation for the different results for door-to-door donations and direct mail 
donations relates to the different mechanisms that determine giving with these methods. 
Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) identified eight theoretical mechanisms that promote charitable 
giving.
2
 The clearest mechanism at work in the case of both door-to-door and direct mail 
donations is the solicitation mechanism. People are requested to make a donation. However, 
the two solicitations differ strongly on another mechanism: reputation. The door-to-door 
donation is directly observable by the person soliciting for the charitable organization.
3
 Not 
giving will negatively affect someone’s social reputation. Experimental studies show that the 
                                      
2
 The eight mechanisms Bekkers and Wiepking identified are (1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs 
and benefits; (4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy. 
3
 In the Netherlands, people conduct door-to-door solicitations for charitable organizations in their own 
neighbourhood. Often people know the person soliciting for a gift. 
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more visible requests for gifts, the higher the comply rates (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 
1996).  
Donations in direct mail campaigns on the other hand are mostly not observable by others: 
There are no social consequences of not giving. The mechanism at work in the case of direct 
mail donations is the psychological benefits mechanism. When giving entails positive 
psychological benefits, people are said to have positive personal norms (Schwartz, 1970). 
Personal norms strengthen the effect of social norms. When the social norm is to give, those 
who feel bad about themselves for violating the norm are more likely to give. Not giving 
would entail feelings of guilt, shame, or dissonance with one’s self-image.  
Thus people who have positive personal norms are more likely to reinforce these norms by 
making donations in direct mail campaigns. It is likely that specifically these people are 
susceptible to social information on giving. This would explain the limited support for the 
social information hypothesis in the case of direct mail giving.  
Other studies have shown that social information on giving can be manipulated (e.g., 
Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr, 2001; e.g., Shang, 2008). Charitable organizations should 
provide potential donors with various financial resources with more tailored social 
information on donations. This could for example increase the likelihood of receiving higher 
donations from those with more financial capabilities. Furthermore, based on the results of 
this study, fundraisers should provide potential donors with social information (for example a 
specific amount other people donated in similar circumstances) on donations specifically 
when soliciting with methods that have high compliance rates, such as door-to-door or street 
campaigns, or when approaching people they believe are willing to make a donation. This will 
affect the perceived norms for giving (the amount the potential donor think he or she should 
give) and consequently the amount actually donated.  
This is a first empirical test of the giving standard hypothesis. Wiepking (2007) argued that a 
giving standard could explain the negative relationship between income and proportional 
donations. Because people in different income categories donate approximately the same 
amounts in separate instances, lower income households donate a higher percentage of their 
income to charitable organizations.  
Despite the clear merits of this paper, there are some methodological issues. First of all, our 
conclusions are based on Dutch data. It is difficult to assess whether we would have drawn 
similar conclusions when studying data relating to a different (cultural) context. The 
charitable sector in the Netherlands has a long history and the Dutch are known to be 
generous donors (Van Leeuwen, 1994; Salamon, Sokolowski, and List, 2003; Wiepking, 
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2009; Wiepking and Bekkers, 2008). The Dutch might be more aware of the level of 
donations made by others than people in other countries, and it is hard to say how this might 
have affected our results. We do draw conclusions similar to Shang (2008), in her 
experimental studies on the effects of social information on giving in the United States. At 
least in the Netherlands and the United States, the effect of social information on donations is 
comparable. Secondly, our conclusions can only be generalized for donation instances in 
which people use door-to-door and direct mail giving, and to a lesser extent regularly 
scheduled payments. We expect that, for example, there might be differences in social 
information between people belonging to different religious denominations when other types 
of donations would be considered. Religiously affiliated people often make donations in 
church. Maybe people with different religious affiliations would differ significantly in their 
social information for giving in church. The limitation to only three types of donations is a 
clear disadvantage of our study. On the other hand, most experiments on conditional 
cooperation examine only one method of giving, and how it can be used to increase donor 
support. Future research would be welcome to better understand the importance of social 
information for charitable giving in other countries and cultural contexts. Furthermore, it 
would be very interesting to examine how the social information effect can be implemented 
by fundraising professionals to increase donor support. 
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Table 1 Description of the variables used in the study (GINPS05, 2005) 
 
   Min. Max. Mean Median S.E. 
Social information door-to-door donation 1223 0 250 3.23 2.00 10.36 
Social information direct mail donation 1160 0 500 8.66 5.00 20.53 
Social information bank transfer 1194 0 250 9.70 5.00 17.19 
       
Yearly after-tax household income (ln) 1474 0 12.82 9.89 10.09 1.25 
       
Perceived social norms for door-to-door donation 1332 0 200 2.98 2.00 7.90 
Perceived social norms for direct mail donation 1223 0 500 8.11 5.00 20.55 
Perceived social norms for bank transfer 1266 0 250 9.19 5.00 15.06 
       
Actual amount donated in door-to-door collection 614 0 107 3.14 2.00 8.68 
Actual amount donated in direct mail campaign 229 0 125 6.55 0.00 17.06 
ote: GINPS05 does not include information about actual donation made in a bank transfer; 
table 1 displays weighted results. 
 16 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual model for conditional cooperation 
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Figure 2 Social information and perceived social norms for giving (GINPS05; weighted 
results) 
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Figure 3a Beta (standardized) coefficients for relationships between social information, 
perceived norms, and actual giving in door-to-door giving (N=614; beta coefficients in 
parentheses report the beta weights computed after the mediating relationship has been taken 
into account) 
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Figure 3b Beta (standardized) coefficients for relationships between social information, 
perceived norms, and actual giving in direct mail giving (N=229; beta coefficients in 
parentheses report the beta weights computed after the mediating relationship has been taken 
into account) 
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Figure 4 Perceived norms for giving and actual donation in door-to-door donations and direct 
mail donations by income category (GINPS05; weighted results) 
 
  
 
